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ABSRACT: The main premise of this article is an examination of the right to life during 
policing operations. The article will focus on the international and European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) standards. One of the Courts seminal cases was that of McCann 
v United Kingdom. This case set down strict standards on the right to life during policing 
operations. The article will show that these strict standards have been eroded with the 
evolution of terrorism in Europe. It will be shown that the ECtHR has facilitated this 
erosion by applying a consequentialist reasoning to its most recent judgments. It will also 
be advanced that these measures, adopted to tackle contemporary terrorism, have blurred 
the lines between policing and the military and this could potentially be exacerbated by 
the European Union’s project to harmonise policing. The article will posit that the 
international standards on the right to life provide a framework which is applicable to any 
situation where there is the potential for the use of lethal force by the police. These 
standards do not require special measures which place the right to life as ancillary to the 
objectives of the State. 
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Introduction 
The case of McCann v The United Kingdom (1995) Series A no 324, decided on the 27th 
September 1995, was one of the seminal cases before the  ECtHR involving the use of 
lethal force by a State in an anti-terrorist operation. McCann laid down principles that 
were considered a corner stone for examining the use of lethal force by the State. The 
principles established in McCann by the ECtHR should have stood the test of time, but it 
will be shown in this article that they have been eroded to the point of being irrelevant. 
Some of the most recent cases examining policing operations before the ECtHR, 
Finogenov and Others v Russia and Da Silva v United Kingdom have shown an 
inconsistent approach by the Court and a reluctance to genuinely tackle the difficult 
questions. One of the Courts most recent judgments, Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, 
while finding an Article 2 violation has essentially tiered the right to life based on the 
scale of the situation faced by State agents, stated: 
 [T]he Court confirms that a difference should be drawn between “routine police 
operations” and situations of large-scale anti-terrorist operations. In the latter case, 
often in situations of acute crisis requiring “tailor-made” responses, the States 
should be able to rely on solutions that would be appropriate to the circumstances.1  
Tagayeva has also legitimised the approach in Finogenov and in the same breath drew 
contrasts in the situations faced by the authorities. The ECtHR in Finogenov has afforded 
a post facto justification for special police measures based on a State fear of the potential 
consequences for not employing them. The current approach by the ECtHR on the use of 
lethal force by State agents is consequentialist in nature and is far removed from the initial 
human rights centric reasoning seen in McCann. The subsidiary nature of the Court 
facilitates  a long and arduous journey for a case to be heard. The incident leading to the 
judgement in Finogenov occurred in 2002 with the final judgment being delivered 2012, 
in the Da Silva case the incident occurred in 2005 and the Courts judgment was delivered 
in 2016.  These cases do not come before the ECtHR that often and as such, they allow 
special policing measures to develop into acceptable policing practice before the next 
Article 2 challenge. The judgment in Finogenov was cited as precedence of the ECtHR 
in Tagayeva, the judgment of which was delivered in 2017. The ECtHR has recently 
demonstrated its continued willingness to allow the development of special policing 
measures even when an opportunity to intervene presented itself. The ECtHR has rejected 
an interim measure under rule 39 of the Rules of the Court relating to the use of specialist 
impact munitions by the French police in the “yellow vest” protests. This is even after the 
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović in a report on the 
26th February 2019 advocated that use of such weapons should be cessed immediately.2 
It will be a prolonged period before this case is giving a hearing date before the ECtHR. 
The damage will have unfortunately already been done by this stage and individual rights 
eroded. This indifference to a human rights-based reason can be seen in both Finogenov 
and Da Silva. It will be argued that the ECtHR has eroded the substantive aspect of the 
right to life alongside principles of international human rights law with its judgments in 
the Finogenov and Da Silva cases. Judgments of which have found favour in subsequent 
cases.  
 
     This paper argues that the international human rights standards are the most applicable 
to policing terrorist threats and consistent in their approach to protecting the right to life 
during policing operations. They lay down a rights-based reasoning for the protection of 
life during policing operations. The United Nations Special Rapporteurs have been 
resolute in echoing the pre-eminence of the right to life and suggest that adherence to the 
international standards does not restrict the ability of the police to tackle terrorism. As the 
fear of violence in society increases it is important that police services develop transparent 
standards which citizens can embrace as effective in safeguarding their rights but are also 
effective in tackling terrorism. 
    The paper is not concerned with the issue of terrorism per-se, but on the legal standards 
to which the police must observe when dealing with terrorism. The use of suicide 
bombings in the United Kingdom in 2005 marked a turning point in how policing 
domestic terrorism was addressed. In the United Kingdom, Newburn considers the issue 
of terrorism as no new phenomenon but points out that the London 7/7 bombings were 
the first suicide bombing in Western Europe.3 Shaw posits a similar position but describes 
the increase of intensity in terrorism.4 The Independent Police Complaints Commission, 
in their report on the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes, recognised that terrorism has 
evolved from the time of the IRA and that 7/7 was the first suicide bombing in the United 
Kingdom.5 Newburn also voices the position that modern terrorist groups are formed 
predominantly on their ideology rather than territory and also that their means of 
communication is, ‘as likely to be conducted via internet and satellite phones as face-to-
face.’6 He further advances that, ‘most extreme terrorist threats come from loose networks 
of small groups that are not based in any particular country or region.’7  
    In considering all these points it can be taken that terrorism does pose a genuine threat 
to life. It can also be accepted that terrorism has posed a threat to society for a considerable 
period of time, with the evolution of terrorism being essentially an evolution in methods 
and demographics. As terrorism is a reality of modern day society, it can be inferred from 
the international legal standards and the case law of the ECtHR that States have a duty to 
take positive measures to protect society from terrorist attacks.8 Many of the measures 
being implemented to tackle terrorism have been afforded a margin of appreciation by 
the ECtHR and fall short in their capability to protect the right to life. These special 
policing measures are also occurring beyond the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights and encompass the European Union’s project of harmonisation of policing 
methods throughout the EU.  This harmonisation is notable in joint policing exercises 
conducted by the ATLAS network of EU States special intervention units under the 
auspices of the European Commission. In support of  this network the  EU Commissioner 
for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström  stated that:  
The fight against terrorism is one of the key challenges to our internal security. 
Terrorism does not recognise borders and maintaining public security is a 
complex challenge which requires the coordination of our efforts. I believe that 
the cooperation between police authorities in Europe is more necessary now than 
ever and I welcome the exercise of the ATLAS network.9 
This is cause for concern as it has the potential to generate conflict between community 
policing models utilised in the UK and gendarmerie style policing models in mainland 
Europe. It is disconcerting that the European Court of Human Rights is establishing a 
consequentialist based reasoning in deciding actions of police as opposed to a human 
rights-based reasoning on which their judgments have been previously based. 
Consequentialist based reasoning is a moral theory that judges actions on their overall 
beneficial consequence for society. In the context of policing operations consequentialism 
is considered from the perspective of the overall benefit to society that is derived from 
employing special policing measures in targeting terrorism. This includes the use of these 
measures in situations where the outcome is not entirely positive. Consequentialist 
reasoning is at odds with human rights-based reason as individual rights recognised in the 
ECHR are subsumed into a greatest good for the greatest number justification.  The fear 
and acts of terrorism are leading the harmonisation of European policing in the direction 
of the security State and away from the constitutional state. The ECtHR is facilitating this 
direction.  
 
International principles on the use of force by police officers 
The right to life is protected by a number of International Declarations and Treaties. 
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognises the right to life, 
‘everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of the person.’10 Similarly, Article 
6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that, 
‘every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No 
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.’11 Notably, Article 6 is not an all-
encompassing right and some infringement is justified within the competence of the State. 
For example, Article 6 does not prohibit the death penalty, but does restrict it to adults 
and for the most serious crimes.12 Significantly, Article 6(1) obligates States to enact 
legislation to protect life. It is evident from the text referring to the arbitrary deprivation 
of life,13 that additional measures are required to regulate the actions of State agents. 
Taken with the proclamation of the General Assembly in the preamble to the UDHR, 
States are duty bound to enact legislation regulating the use of lethal force by the police 
and in this regard, the legislation must be effective.  
 
      The right to life in Article 6 has been explored by the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee in General Comment No: 6 and a number of important principles have been 
drawn from the substantive wording.14 The right to life is ‘the supreme right from which 
no derogation is permitted even in time of public emergency which threatens the life of a 
nation.’15 In this regard, the advent of contemporary terrorism could be considered a 
public emergency, with Security Council resolution 1377 declaring it, ‘one of the most 
serious threats to international peace and security in the twenty-first century.’16 In this 
vein, ‘States have the supreme duty to prevent (…) acts of mass violence causing arbitrary 
loss of life.’17 Critically there is a balance to be struck between the obligation on States 
not to take life but also the ultimate duty to protect the public from situations of mass 
violence. This balance is however falling on the side of security state with special policing 
measures weighing the lesser of two evils approach in tackling terrorism. 
 
     The Committee, in continuing to examine the principles stemming from Article 6, 
propose that, ‘States parties should take measures not only to prevent and punish 
deprivation of life by criminal acts, but also to prevent arbitrary killing by their own 
security forces.’18 This is further qualified by recognising that the, ‘deprivation of life by 
the authorities of the State is a matter of the utmost gravity. Therefore, the law must 
strictly control and limit the circumstance in which a person may be deprived of his life 
by such authorities.’19 This means that States have positive obligations to protect the right 
to life, which entails a duty to have a legal framework to regulate the use of force by State 
agents that has the potential to be lethal. While General Comment No. 6 expands the 
understanding of Article 6(1), it is non-specific in nature and leaves much ambiguity 
surrounding the extent of the measures required by the States parties. For this reason it is 
necessary to examine the reports of the Special Rapporteurs on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions to fully explore the extent and boundaries of the right. 
 
    Special Rapporteur Christof Heyns firmly recognises the duty on States to take positive 
measures to prevent the loss of life.20 These include, but are not restricted to, having 
proper command and control structures within the police, proper training of the police, 
which includes training in the use of force.21 Heyns identifies three essential elements to 
justify the use of lethal force by State agents which stem from Article 6(1).22 The elements 
are legality, necessity and proportionality. Dealing with the legality element first, the right 
to life is not an absolute right and in certain limited circumstance the use of lethal force 
by a State agent is justifiable, this however has to be regulated by law.23 These laws have 
to meet international standards and they must be published and available to the citizens 
of the State.24 The law must define the circumstances in which lethal force can be used 
and recognise that, ‘the only objective that can be legitimate when lethal force is used is 
to save the life of a person or to protect a person from serious harm.’25 In addition, the 
onus of proving that the use of lethal force was justified is on the individuals using it.26  
    The next element is that of necessity; was it necessary to use lethal force. This element 
is considered to have three aspects to it, qualitative, quantitative, and temporal.27 The 
necessity principle entails that, ‘force can only be necessary when a legitimate objective 
is pursued.’28  The qualitative aspect with regard to potentially lethal force indicates that 
the legitimate aim could not be achieved by other means.29 The quantitative aspects means 
that the amount of force used was not excessive to achieve the legitimate aim.30 The 
temporal aspect refers to the immediacy of the threat to life, ‘the use of force must be 
used against a person who presents an immediate threat.’31 The necessity principle is 
further qualified in relation to the use of lethal force, with the applicable standard being 
that of absolute necessity.32  
 
    The necessity principle is also considered from the proviso of the positive obligation 
to protect, meaning that measures should be taken in order to limit the circumstances 
where force will be considered necessary in the circumstances, ‘in order to save lives, all 
possible measures should be taken “upstream” to avoid situations where the decision to 
pull the trigger arises, or to ensure that all the possible steps have been taken to ensure 
that if that happens, the damage is contained as much as is possible.’33 It would indicate 
that the necessity principle will not be met unless other measures are considered prior to 
a use of lethal or potentially lethal force. This would be applicable on a subjective use of 
force bases and the overall measures taken by a police service to manage the potential 
risk to life.   
 
    The final element of a use of force is the proportionality test. Proportionality is the 
measure of the amount of force used against the level of harm envisaged, ‘proportionality 
requires that the good that is done must be compared with the threat posed.’34 In 
comparing the necessity limb with the proportionality limb, Heyns eloquently describes 
their relationship as, ‘if necessity can be visualised as the ladder proportionality is a scale 
that determines how high up the ladder of force one is allowed to go.’35 Additionally, 
when applying the proportionality test to the use of lethal force it must be measured to a 
standard of strict proportionality.36 For the use of lethal force or potentially lethal force 
to be considered justifiable all three elements must be met. These are the bases of the 
applicable international legal standards for the use of lethal force by State agents and need 
to be measured against the actual actions of States in combating terrorism. 
 
Application of the international right to life principles to shoot-to-kill policies 
Martin Scheinin argues ‘that suicide bombings present a particular challenge to counter-
terrorism measures, in that they may cause the loss of human lives and are extremely 
difficult to predict and prevent.’37 If the consideration of protecting life is the only 
justification for the intentional use of lethal force, what then are the limitations in policing 
on shooting to kill?38 Special Rapporteur Philip Alston suggests that; 
The rhetoric of shoot-to-kill serves only to displace clear legal standards with a 
vaguely defined licence to kill, risking confusion among law enforcement officers, 
endangering innocent persons, and rationalizing mistakes, while avoiding the 
genuinely difficult challenges that are posed by the relevant threat.39  
   In the analysis of the legality of a shoot to kill policy there are very strong 
determinations forwarded that, ‘there is no conflict between, for example, the human right 
not to be blown up by a terrorist and the human right not to be arbitrarily shot by the 
police.’40 
    A serious misconception of human rights law is debunked in the report and attention 
drawn to the fact that human rights law recognises that in certain limited circumstances 
lethal force is justifiable to protect individuals from serious harm or death.41 The report 
references back to the necessity principle on this point, indicating that measures should 
be taken prior to the need for lethal force.42 It must be noted that the Special Rapporteurs 
do not skirt over this issue; they take great cognisance of the very real threat of terrorism.43 
They posit that effective policing can be achieved without the erosion of internationally 
recognised human rights.44 They are also the only individuals highlighting and defending 
the right to life during policing operations.  
 
    Finally, Alston addressed the issue of the inevitable subjective assessment by the police 
officer administering the force, as to whether the suspect is or is not a suicide bomber.45 
He states that it is important to consider, ‘the legal implications of the limited information 
officers will almost invariably have.’46 This information will have to be considered by the 
individual officer in light of what they see prior to the administration of force by them, 
‘the burden will often fall on individual officers to evaluate whether a given person is a 
suicide bomber or not.’47 This is important in light of the standard of absolute necessity, 
‘suspicion is not enough to justify a resort to lethal force. There is no legal basis for 
shooting to kill for any reason other than near certainty that to do otherwise will lead to a 
loss of life.’48 
 
   Any shoot to kill policy utilised by States must, ‘develop legal frameworks to properly 
incorporate intelligence information and analysis into both the operational planning and 
post-incident accountability phases of State responsibility.’49  It would also need to 
include the protection of life principle, that the use of lethal force was for the purpose of 
saving a life.50 This would signpost the need for domestic legislation to be compatible 
with international human rights standards.  
 
   Notably, the United Kingdom applies a purely subjective test to the use of force by 
police officers.51 It would be incompatible within their domestic legal frameworks to 
employ a shoot to kill policy, as this encroaches on the purely subjective assessment 
required by law to be made by the individual police officers administering the force and 
by extension, incompatible with international law. Interestingly, the term ‘shoot to 
incapacitate’ has been employed by the police but this still represents a shoot to kill 
policy.52 Police firearms officers are trained to shoot to the torso which, in effect, is 
shooting to kill and “shooting in this way will kill”.53 
 
    Heyns has considered the possibility of a police officer shooting at the extremities as a 
valid option to reduce potential harm.54 This is an interesting option but it would be 
difficult to reconcile from the point that, police officers should only use firearms based 
on an imminent threat of serious harm or death, they are an option of last resort. In a later 
report he states that, ‘all uses of firearms against people should be treated as lethal or 
potentially lethal force.’55 In considering this point, if the option of shooting to the 
extremities presented itself, it would be difficult to contend that an imminent threat to life 
existed as shooting to the extremities is extremely difficult and would exponentially 
increase the risk to others in the vicinity.56 If the situation was of the nature that this option 
was available it would fall within the purview of less-lethal weapons, such as a TASER 
or specialist impact munitions, ‘officers more readily resorting to their guns at a lower 
level of risk ultimately having the unintended and undesirable consequence of yet more 
people being fired upon, and injured or killed by armed police.’57 These policies weigh 
less the right to life as opposed to the balancing of the action against the believed 
consequence of not acting. The special Rapporteurs appear to be the only individuals 
genuinely highlighting this erosion in rights in the context of policing operations.      
Right to life and the European Convention on Human Rights 
The right to life article within the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is 
detailed within Article 2.  Article 2 states that;  
Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his 
life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. (2) Deprivation 
of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it 
results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (A) In 
defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest 
or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken 
for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection (emphasis added).58   
 
   The substantive wording of Article 2(2) enjoins two tenants, the obligation on the State 
to protect life and the circumstance in which a deprivation of life can be considered 
justifiable; a negative and positive obligation.  
    The negative obligation, in essence, places a duty on the State to refrain from 
interfering in an individual’s enjoyment of their rights.59 The positive obligation attached 
to the right to life creates an onus on State authorities to take measures during policing 
operations to minimise the risk to life.60 This onus applies to all possible individuals who 
could potentially be affected by the operation, whether they are a potential victim of a 
criminal act or the police officers involved.61 The obligation is owed both vertically and 
horizontally; meaning that the actions of police officers which potentially creates a risk 
of serious harm or death has to be regulated and properly controlled to minimise that 
risk.62 While the horizontal obligation entails a duty by the State to protect citizens from 
a known risk of serious harm or death from third parties.63  
Principles on planning and controlling police operations from the ruling in McCann 
and Others v The United Kingdom 
The seminal case that identifies the obligations on member States is that of McCann and 
Others v The United Kingdom.64 McCann runs like a golden thread through subsequent 
cases involving States obligations to protect life. It must be noted that McCann, although 
heralded as a definitive judgment, was decided by a majority verdict of only 10 votes to 
9 votes.65 McCann involved an intelligence led policing operation in Gibraltar, which 
entailed the use of military personnel from the British Special Air Services.66 The 
information in the possession of the police indicated that a three person active service unit 
of the provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) was planning a terrorist attack at an 
identified time and location in Gibraltar.67 The identity of the three persons was also 
known to the police.68 
    The three terrorist suspects managed to enter Gibraltar without initially alerting the 
authorities.69 The policing operation was subsequently handed over to military personnel; 
after a car was parked by the suspects in the vicinity of the target location.70 The military 
personnel were tasked with apprehending the three suspects.71 The ensuing events led to 
the three suspects being shot and killed.72 It subsequently turned out that three suspects 
were not in possession of any detonating devices and the vehicle contained no 
explosives.73 The family of the three suspects took proceedings alleging that State agents 
had violated the Article 2 rights of the three persons who were killed.74 
 
    The ECtHR considered that Article 2 must be interpreted and applied “so as to make 
its safeguards practical and effective.’75 This finding suggest that States would be obliged 
to have polices and processes in place to give effect to the Courts interpretation.  
     The ECtHR also points to the fact that Article 2 not only protects the right to life but 
lays down the situations in which deprivation of life may be justified, when resulting from 
the use of force that is absolutely necessary considering the circumstances.76 In 
acknowledging the importance of Article 2, the ECtHR stresses that any alleged violation 
will involve the utmost enquiry;  
In keeping with the importance of this provision (art.2) in a democratic society, 
the court must, in making its assessment, subject deprivations of life to the most 
careful scrutiny, particularly where deliberate lethal force is used, taking into 
consideration not only the actions of the agents of the state who actually 
administer the force but also all the surrounding circumstances including such 
matters as the planning and control of the actions under examination.77  
     The ECtHR will not only look at the subjective assessment of the individual who used 
the force but at the overall planning and control of the situation that led to the use of force. 
The ECtHR also indicates by the use of the word “including”, that the matters specified 
as subject to examination are not exhaustive.78 This is quite an important point as the 
European Convention on Human Rights is seen as a living instrument capable of 
evolving. The ECtHR, later in the judgment, contended that operational control and 
training were issues within the context of this case that brought about a need for 
examination relating to the proportionality of the State’s response to a terrorist attack.79  
     This would mean that State agencies would have an obligation to facilitate appropriate 
training that would encompass planning, control and the subjective assessment of the use 
of force. This would have to be the case, as an assessment of proportionality would be 
extremely difficult without considering the overall context of the training received. 
     The ECtHR, in its assessment, held that the State agents that used the lethal force were 
justified within the context of the information available to them, on the premise of an 
honestly held belief. For example: 
The Court accepts that the soldiers honestly believed, in the light of the 
information that they had been given, (..) that it was necessary to shoot the 
suspects in order to prevent them from detonating a bomb and causing serious loss 
of life (..). The actions which they took, in obedience to superior orders, were thus 
perceived by them as absolutely necessary in order to safeguard innocent lives. It 
considers that the use of force by agents of the State in pursuit of one of the aims 
delineated in paragraph 2 of Article 2 (art. 2-2) of the Convention may be justified 
under this provision (art. 2-2) where it is based on an honest belief which is 
perceived, for good reason, to be valid at the time but which subsequently 
turns out to be mistaken. To hold otherwise would be to impose an unrealistic 
burden on the state and its law enforcement personnel in the execution of their 
duty, perhaps to the detriment of their lives and those of others (emphasis 
added).80  
    The ECtHR subsequently addressed the control and organisation of the operation, in 
which they found serious flaws that led to a situation where the use of lethal force, ‘was 
almost unavoidable.’81 The ECtHR stated that, ‘there was a serious miscalculation by 
those responsible for controlling the operation.’82 The ECtHR determined that it should 
confine its judgment to the situation in Gibraltar and concluded that the authorities should 
have intervened earlier and not allowed the situation to unfold as it did.83  
     The ECtHR noted that narrow assumptions were made based on the intelligence 
available most of which turned out to be flawed.84 These assumptions also failed to allow 
for the possibility of alternative scenarios arising.85 It can be taken from the ECtHR 
verdict that authorities who have the responsibility to plan and control such operations 
must have an effective decision making process capable of assessing information and 
implementing a strategy that can take cognisance of evolving circumstances.86 
    The ECtHR was particularly critical of the personnel utilised in the operation, 
particularly the use of soldiers.87 This shows that those responsible for the planning and 
controlling of operations must take cognisance of the training received by the individuals 
involved.  
   The ECtHR stressed the view that soldiers in terms of policing operations;  
Lack (…) the degree of caution in the use of firearms to be expected from law 
enforcement personnel in a democratic society, even when dealing with dangerous 
terrorist suspects, and stands in marked contrast to the standard of care reflected 
in the instructions in the use of firearms by the police which had been drawn to 
their attention and which emphasised the legal responsibilities of the individual 
officer in light of the conditions prevailing at the moment of engagement.88 
   The ECtHR , considering all the aspects of the facts, found that there was a violation of 
Article 2(2) of the Convention. The ECtHR had recognised a human rights-based 
approach to the use of lethal force by State agents and one which was intended to form 
the basis of  planning of policing incidents.  
The erosion of the planning and control principles after McCann: The cases of 
Finogenov and De Menezes 
It will be shown that the evolution of terrorism has created a reluctance by the ECtHR to 
apply the McCann principles so resolutely. With the ECtHR applying consequentialist 
reasoning to their decisions, this has resulted in allowing the security State to  trump the 
right to life.  
Finogenov and others v. Russia 
The case of Finogenov and Others v. Russia (app no 18299/03 and 27311/03) involved 
an anti-terrorist operation in response to Chechen rebels seizing control of a theatre in 
Moscow and holding the occupants hostage.89 On the 23rd of October 2002 over 40 
terrorists took 900 people hostage and they were held at gun point for three days.90 The 
terrorists had explosive devices set around the building and 18 suicide bombers positioned 
with the hostages.91 Negotiations were initiated which initially led to the release of some 
hostages. Notwithstanding, the Russian authorities on the 26th October 2002 pumped an 
unknown gas into the building in a bid to bring about a state of unconsciousness to all 
inside so the security services could storm the building.92 The security services 
subsequently entered the building and shot most of the suicide bombers while they were 
unconscious.93 Some of the suicide bombers were not fully unconscious but resisted and 
were killed.94  
    The case was brought by a number of the families of the hostages, many of whom died 
due to the unknown gas. There had been an investigation into the incident by the Russian 
authorities. The ECtHR, at the outset, acknowledged its subsidiary role to domestic 
proceedings but held, ‘nonetheless, where allegations are made under Articles 2 and 3 of 
the Convention, the Court must apply a particular thorough scrutiny (…) even if certain 
domestic proceedings and investigations have already taken place.’95  
    In considering the general principles recognised as emanating from Article 2, the Court 
advanced that, ‘the use of lethal force by law enforcement officers may be justified in 
certain circumstances. Nonetheless Article 2 does not grant them carte blanche.’96 The 
Court further posits in the light of the Human Rights Committee General Comment 6 that 
policing operations, ‘as well as being authorised under national law, policing operations 
must be sufficiently regulated by it, within the framework of a system of adequate and 
effective safeguards against arbitrariness.’97  
     In the context of an incident where lethal force is used, the ECtHR held that it was 
difficult to detach the States negative obligations from their positive obligation and due 
to this the only way in which they could determine whether the State had not violated 
Article 2 was to examine the overall command and control of the policing operation.98 
This will encompass an examination of; 
[W]hether the policing operation was planned and controlled by the authorities so 
as to minimise, to the greatest extent possible, recourse to lethal force and human 
losses, and whether feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of a 
security operation were taken.99  
    The ECtHR in referencing Osman determined that the positive obligations on the State 
are not absolute and that cognisance has to be taken of the, ‘difficulties involved in 
policing modern day societies, the unpredictability of human conduct.’100 
     The ECtHR at this point begins to depart from McCann on the standard of absolute 
necessity;101 Authorities, it argues: 
May occasionally depart from that rigorous standard of “absolute necessity”. As 
(…) its application may be simply impossible where certain aspects of the 
situation lie far beyond the court’s expertise and where that authorities had to act 
under tremendous pressure and where their control of the situation was 
minimal.102   
      This is a major departure not only from McCann but the international legal standards. 
The absolute necessity principle is in the substantive wording of Article 2 and is the 
standard that the use of lethal force is measured. Evaluating this decision against the 
contemporary terrorist incidents in Europe, where the authorities have had to operate 
under incredible pressure and have limited or no control of the situations appears to infer 
that the police no longer need to meet the standard set by Article 2. Has the ECtHR eroded 
the absolute necessity principle for lethal force in tackling this contemporary terrorism? 
If this is the case, it would be a departure from McCann and the international standards 
which the Special Rapporteurs posit are robust enough to deal with the very real threat of 
contemporary terrorism. The ECtHR in Tagayeva has affirmed the position in Finogenov  
that the absolute necessity test isn’t so absolute: 
 The absolute necessity test formulated in Article 2 is bound to be applied with 
different degrees of scrutiny, depending on whether and to what extent the 
authorities were in control of the situation and other relevant constraints inherent 
in operative decision-making in this sensitive sphere.103 
    The  ECtHR goes on to say that they are, ‘acutely conscious of the difficulties faced by 
States in protecting their populations from terrorist violence and recognises the 
complexity of this problem.’104 This would be a similar view to that held by the Special 
Rapporteurs but they do not consider a need to erode the absolute necessity principle. In 
creating a further distance from McCann the court acknowledged the limited control the 
authorities had over the actions of the terrorists inside the theatre and that the use of 
soldiers was justifiable;  
[I]n such a situation [the] Court accepts that the difficult and agonising decisions 
had to be made by the domestic authorities. It is prepared to grant them a margin 
of appreciation, at least in so far as the military and technical aspects of the 
situation are concerned, even if now, with hindsight, some of the decisions taken 
by the authorises may appear in doubt.105 
      The question referred to the aim of the authorities entering the building and if the aim 
was to protect the lives of the hostages, ‘the question is whether those aims could have 
been attained by other, less drastic, means.’106 
      The EctHR, in finding that this aspect of the planning and control of the situation was 
not a violation of Article 2, held, ‘that there existed a real, serious and immediate risk of 
mass human losses and that the authorities had every reason to believe that a forced 
intervention was the “lesser evil” in the circumstances.’107 The lesser evil appears to be a 
far lower standard then previously held by the ECtHR and the international standards of 
absolute necessity. This is a situation which shows the evolution of terrorism from what 
was seen in McCann and it appears the ECtHR has evolved with it. The ECtHR does not 
even consider in its verdict that many of the suicide bombers were in fact killed while 
they were unconscious.108  
     In examining whether the use of the gas was a violation of Article 2 the ECtHR cited 
the UN basic principles, ‘which indicated that law and regulations on the use of force 
should be sufficiently detailed and should describe, inter alia, the types of arms and 
ammunition permitted.’109 The ECtHR considered that national regulations were not 
sufficiently clear on the use of the gas, nonetheless they held that this was not in itself 
enough to find a violation of Article 2.110 The ECtHR, in finding no violation of Article 
2 from the use of the gas, stated that ‘even if necessary regulations did exist, they probably 
would be of limited use in the situation at hand, which was totally unpredictable, 
exceptional and required a tailor-made response.’111 This essentially allows State agents 
a carte blanche on how they conduct policing operations. This is not compliant with 
international law which concludes that if States do not have an adequate legal framework 
regulating the use of force by State agents, the State is in breach of international law.112 
This is irrespective as to whether the situation they were facing was unique, every 
contemporary terrorist attack could be considered as being unique, this does not allow for 
the erosion of the right to life.113 The use of a still unknown gas has been cited as an 
acceptable police tactic by the ECtHR in Tagayeva, based on balance of more likely than 
not. It is a low bar for the ECtHR to balance the right to life on: 
  [W]here it had found that the use of gas could not be qualified as 
“indiscriminate”, as it had left the hostages a high chance of survival, depending 
on the efficiency of the subsequent rescue efforts.114  
   It can be seen from this case that there has been an erosion of international human rights 
standards and a reluctance to apply the strict principles established in McCann. It is yet 
to be seen if this is a permanent departure in response to the threat of suicide terrorism, 
however, early indications from  the judgment in Tagayeva demonstrate that it is.  
 
KRATOS: a shoot to kill policy? 
KRATOS is a policing policy in the United Kingdom which allows for a superior officer 
to direct a firearms officer to use lethal force in order to neutralise a suspected suicide 
bomber.115 Only limited information on KRATOS was released by the authorities, but the 
European Court of Human Rights has held that this is acceptable even though it would be 
difficult to determine an Article 2 violation without the full facts, ‘It also formally 
recognises the need to respect the security concerns and thus keep certain aspects of the 
operations secret.’116 The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) (now the 
Independent Office for Police Conduct), in considering the legality of KRATOS, 
examined the relevant legislation and acknowledged that the test as to whether a use of 
force in self-defence or in defence of others is lawful is entirely subjective; 117nonetheless 
KRATOS essentially removes this subjective aspect and the police officer is operating 
under superior orders.118 The IPCC then considered separately whether KRATOS was 
legal in terms of the obligations under Article 2, they considered Osman and McCann 
from the view of the obligation of the State to take measures to protect life and the 
absolute necessity principle.119  
      The IPCC further echoed that, ‘a shoot to kill policy devised in order to deal with the 
threat of the suicide bomber. By definition, it cannot ‘fail safe’ if there is an operational 
error.’120 Operation KRATOS could not be considered legal in the present circumstances 
as the individual administering the force is the only person subjected to confines of the 
domestic law.121 For KRATOS to be considered lawful the domestic law on the use of 
lethal force would have to account for the significant role the commanding officer plays 
in issuing the order to kill.122 The IPCC agreed with this point indicating that for 
KRATOS to be lawful, ‘it must accord with domestic law and it must be Convention 
compliant.’123 The IPCC nonetheless, in determining the legality of KRATOS, did so in 
one line and stated that the ‘KRATOS policy is not unlawful per-se.’124 Another issue of 
concern was that this policing operation was not fully accounted for within the terms of 
KRATOS or any other policing policy, even though the briefing given to the firearms 
officers were as if it were.125 The initial commander in charge also set up the operation 
with the view that a KRATOS situation could develop.126  
 
The killing of De Menezes 
On Friday 22nd July 2005 at 09.33 Jean Charles De Menezes became the subject of a 
covert anti- terrorist operation when he left his home.127 By 10.06 he was dead.128 Jean 
Charles was an innocent man who at the time was making his way to work.129 In the space 
of 33 minutes Jean Charles was mistakenly believed to be Hussain Osman, a man 
suspected of being involved in a failed suicide bomb attack.130 This shooting however has 
to be examined in context of the surrounding circumstances in which it arose as; both the 
IPCC and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights deem it essential in 
examining whether a violation of Article 2 has occurred. The surrounding circumstances 
are a crucial element in establishing the honestly held belief principle.  
   London had been rocked by four suicide bombings on the 7th July 2005 in which 52 
people were killed.131 On the 21st July the day before Jean Charles was killed the 
Metropolitan police discovered explosive devices at four separate locations. Authorities 
were unable to discern why these viable devices had not exploded.132 The devices were 
similar to those used in the 7th July attacks and the fear was that the two were linked.133 
The Stockwell Report notes that there was a real state of fear at the time in London;  
The atmosphere of fear for those living and working in the capital cannot be 
overestimated. The United Kingdom had never experienced suicide bombings. 
But within 24 hours of the widespread joy felt in the capital of London being 
selected as the city to host the 2012 Olympic Games there was a state of fear and 
panic.134  
    The terrorist threat in the UK was raised to level one which is critical, meaning that the 
authorities expected further terrorist attacks in the coming days by persons who had the 
means and capabilities to carry them out.135  
     The fear was further exacerbated by the failed bombing attempts on the 21st July 2005 
and the belief that authorities needed to find the persons behind them as there, ‘was an 
added fear that the individuals would re-gather the next morning and attempt to cause 
explosions and achieve their objectives.’136  
     The facts of the case are particularly important as they go hand in hand with any Article 
2 examination of the planning and control of policing operations. The operation into the 
events of the 21st July 2005 commenced at 0455 on the 22nd July 2005.137The operation 
was centred on a specific address on Scotia Road, a premises believed to be the residence 
of a suspect involved in the failed suicide bombing attempt the previous day.138 The 
objectives of the operation was to conduct covert surveillance on the premises and if a 
potential suspect left the premises that they were to be followed and stopped when safe 
to do so, any other persons leaving were to be stopped and questioned for the purpose of 
obtaining intelligence on the potential suspects.139 
  At this stage of the operation the senior officer in charge felt that a KRATOS situation 
could develop so put in place the required operational structures. Even though the 
authorities believed that this operation could potentially require the use of lethal force to 
stop a suicide bomber, the specialist firearms officers (SCO19) were not deployed and by 
the time they were, Jean Charles had already left his home.140 
      The report voiced concerns that had Jean Charles actually been a suicide bomber he 
would have been able to carry out his attack while being the subject of this policing 
operation.141 From the time he left his home he was able to get on a bus which was five 
minutes’ walk from his home, get off the same bus walk into a tube station that was 
closed, walk back out of that tube station and get back onto another bus and eventually 
walk into Stockwell Road tube station and get onto a train.142 It must be noted that Jean 
Charles was wearing a light denim jacket and was not carrying anything at the time he 
was shot.143 
   While under surveillance, Jean Charles was never definitively identified as being 
Hussain Osman, nonetheless confusion arose around his identity and the Commander in 
charge of the operation gave an order for him to be stopped. Witnesses to this order state 
that the commander’s words were, ‘the male must not be allowed to get on a train at all 
costs.’144 
   It is at this point the major confusion arose as to what exactly was meant by the 
commander’s words.145 The commander however stated that her words meant that the 
suspect was to be arrested and at no stage did she give the command to take a critical 
shot.146 It is situations like this that the concerns of the Philip Alston are realised and it 
must be reiterated again that he considers that shoot to kill policies serve; 
only to displace clear legal standards with a vaguely defined licence to kill, risking 
confusion among law enforcement officers, endangering innocent persons, and 
rationalizing mistakes, while avoiding the genuinely difficult challenges that are 
posed by the relevant threat.147 
     It was this confusion that led to the death of Jean Charles and a situation where every 
individual who was involved in the incident was absolved of wrong doing. The only 
finding of a failure was that of a corporate nature under health and safety legislation.148 It 
is this point that mirrors the concerns of Alston, the rationalising of mistakes and the 
failure to honestly recognise the considerations involved in tackling terrorism.149 In 
detailing with how this situation developed, it is easy to understand the concerns the 
Special Rapporteurs have for shoot to kill policies and the United Kingdom’s anti- 
terrorist policies. The Special Rapporteurs are highlighting the erosion of the right to life 
as the ECtHR abdicates its responsibility to ensure states are applying a human rights 
reasoning to their policing operations.    
Armani Da Silva v. The United Kingdom 
In Armani Da Silva v. The United Kingdom (app no. 5878/08) decided on the 30th March 
2016, a case was brought to the ECtHR by a cousin of Jean Charles. The case was taken 
as it was claimed that the investigation into the shooting was flawed as no individual had 
been brought before a court to answer for the killing.   
      The major issue of concern with this case is that the ECtHR, sitting as a Grand 
Chamber, restricted its scrutiny of the alleged Article 2 violation to the procedural limb.150 
This, the ECtHR concluded, was due to the complainant’s submissions, which only 
questioned the effectiveness of the domestic investigation.151 The ECtHR nonetheless in 
McCann held that any alleged violation of Article 2 would be examined with the utmost 
scrutiny due to the pre-eminence of the right to life.152 The ECtHR, in not considering the 
substantive element of Article 2, departed from McCann as the Court in that case held, it 
was its duty in interpreting Article 2 that it; 
[M]ust be guided by the fact that the object and purpose of the convention as an 
instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires that its 
provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and 
effective.153  
   For the right to life to be realised both the substantive and procedural limbs have to be 
observed. In McCann the Court held that, ‘a general legal prohibition of arbitrary killing 
by the agents of the State would be ineffective, in practice, if there existed no procedure 
for reviewing the lawfulness of the lethal force by State authorities.’154  
   The ECtHR only considered whether the investigation was carried out in line with the 
States procedural obligations under Article 2 but never considered the legality of the use 
of force or the command and control of the operation.155 In McCann the ECtHR held that 
the State had complied with its procedural obligations but nonetheless found the use of 
force on the substantive aspect of the right to life was a violation of Article 2.156 This goes 
to show that both aspects need to be considered by the ECtHR in order to determine 
whether a violation of the Sates obligations under Article 2 has occurred. 
   Unfortunately, this was not the case in Da Silva and it leaves a lot of uncertainty around 
the applicability of the McCann principles in setting human rights standards for policing 
anti-terrorist operations. This also has to be considered in light of the ECtHR decision in 
Finogenov, which rowed back on many of the strict principles established in McCann. 
The dissenting judges in Da Silva posit some very salient points on the level of scrutiny 
that is expected by the ECtHR in their examination of a violation of Article 2. 
    In a joint dissenting opinion from Judges Karakas, Wojtyczek and Dedov, they advance 
that; 
Substantive and procedural limbs are so closely intertwined in the instant case that 
it is impossible to assess whether the respondent state has fulfilled its obligation 
under the procedural limb of Article 2 without taking into account the substantive 
dimension of the case.157 
   What is more worrying about the decision is that the dissenting judges believed that, 
had the Court considered the substantive element of Article 2 it would have found a 
violation.158 The ECtHR has heralded its function as insuring the safeguards contained in 
the Convention are practical and effective. Nonetheless, by ignoring the substantive 
aspect, the ECtHR as effectively discounted this.159 In acknowledging some positives 
from the dissenting view, it can be seen that McCann is still considered by the ECtHR 
where it outlined that there is a duty of care towards those that could be effected by the 
operation, ‘it was the duty of the police to devise a realistic plan of action which made it 
possible to arrest the suspect without using lethal force. It appears that Mr de Menezes 
could and should have been arrested by the police just after leaving his home.’160 It was 
this failure that created a situation where lethal force was considered to be the only option 
available.161 This same point was raised in McCann.162 
    The ECtHR should be applying the McCann principles along with the international 
standards to all alleged violations of Article 2; instead of abdicating its responsibility as 
the protector of human rights. This can be seen from its failure in Da Silva to question the 
United Kingdom’s policing operations in dealing with the very real threat of suicide 
terrorism. Whether the reason for abdicating its responsibility was the politically sensitive 
climate surrounding the wave of terrorist attacks in Europe, or some other unknown 
reason the decisions in both Finogenov and Da Silva have left the protection of life during 
policing operations in a precarious position. This consequentialist based reasoning is a 
major departure for the earlier human rights centric reasoning in McCann.   
     The Da Silva case arose in the context of a very changed environment than that of 
McCann and, with state agencies adopting measures the UN Special Rapporteurs have 
raised concern over, the ECtHR needed to reaffirm the principles established in McCann. 
It is yet to be seen if we have crossed the Rubicon in the erosion of human rights 
protections during policing operations as it is difficult to even shoe horn the killing of 
Jean Charles De Menezes into the principles established in McCann.  It appears  that the 
security state agenda is a key consideration in the Courts assessment with the right to life 
as ancillary. The normative ethical position of killing Charles De Menes has been 
measured as an acceptable consequence of the pressure the security services were under 
to manage the terrorist attacks in the UK.  
 
 
The legacy of the ECtHR: Expanding the boundaries of permissible force 
The permissible use of force by the police in the wake of the recent Article 2 ruling by 
the ECtHR is unclear. The sweeping authorisation to use lethal force evident from 
Finogenov and Da Silva indicate that the ECtHR has eroded its own established principles 
of limitation. This is seriously problematic and may open the flood gates for special police 
measures that render the right to life ancillary to their objectives of tackling terrorism.  
     Further evidence of the erosion of Article 2 protections on the right to life was evident 
from the use of gas in Finogenov. The International Committee of the Red Cross has 
grave concerns over the use of toxic chemicals by law enforcement agencies.163 In its 
legal fact sheet, it explores the Chemical Weapons Convention 1993 and the international 
drug control treaties that control and essentially forbid the use and production of toxic 
chemicals.164 It draws particular attention to the Finogenov case and it expresses concerns 
about the Courts assessment for the use of toxic chemicals.165 Notably, the ECtHR in 
Finogenov contended that the use of the gas was not considered a violation of Article 2 
as its use was never intended to kill.166  
     Not only is this rowing back on its own previous human rights-based judgments, it is 
cause for concern internationally as the ECtHR appears to weigh more the perceived  
consequence for not employing these measures. In Makaratzis v. Greece the ECtHR held 
that death need not occur from the actions of State agents and, that there need not be an 
intention to kill.167 The ECtHR further advanced that State agents by their conduct merely 
have to create a risk to life of the individual in order to bring a situation within the terms 
of Article 2.168 
The problem of Article 2 and military style policing 
There is a worrying trend forming in Europe where countries such as the United Kingdom 
are employing anti-terrorist tactics that have raised concerns at an international level but 
are ignored by the ECtHR. This trend is even more concerning due to the increased 
harmonisation of policing across the European Union (EU). This harmonisation, while 
not entirely in response to terrorism, has been exponentially fast-tracked due to it.169  
    This harmonisation needs to be considered in light of the Schengen agreement, which 
allows for the free movement of people across member States borders.170 Schengen 
created the need for the harmonisation of policing as the reduced border controls 
potentially had the effect of allowing the free movement of terrorists.171 The Amsterdam 
Treaty created profound changes in policing terms and paved the way for the development 
of, ‘common action among the Member States in the fields of police.’172  
     This harmonisation was further engrained into EU policy with the Treaty of Lisbon 
which saw the EU take charge of policing cooperation; 
The Union shall establish police cooperation involving all the Member States' 
competent authorities, including police, customs and other specialised law 
enforcement services in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of 
criminal offences.173  
     The ATLAS network of European States special intervention units is clear evidence 
of this harmonisation. The European commission has stated that the network is an:  
example of the pro-active stance against terrorism and underlines the solidarity 
and cooperation between European Union Member States as set in Article 222 of 
the Lisbon Treaty, contributing to ensuring the protection of citizens and public 
security in EU.174 
   The  ATLAS network came about as a direct result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and was 
informally established in 2001. Additionally, the network carries out large-scale training 
exercises involving the joint deployments of special intervention units across Europe to 
simulated terrorist attacks throughout Europe. The largest exercise of the network was 
carried out in 2018 with Europol stating that it was necessary to have EU wide policing 
that is interoperable.175 This network was put on a formal footing by the EU in 2008 by 
way of Council Decision  2008/617/JHA and was published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union. This is further evidence of European Policing harmonisation.  
 
     The policing model in the United Kingdom and Ireland are grounded on the principles 
that they are a community-based police service, with a foundational ethos in policing by 
consent. They are predominately unarmed police services unlike policing on mainland 
Europe.  
    Several European States on the other hand employ a gendarmerie style policing model 
along with a traditionally armed police service. Many European Police units like the 
French Gendarmerie, the Italian Carabinieri, the Spanish Guardia, and the Austrian 
Federal Gendarmerie are structured along military lines.176 Gendarmerie style policing in 
the wider context denotes a police service with inherent military characteristics including 
but not limited to the weaponry available and ethos.177 They are considered to be part of 
the police force but ‘have certain military characteristics and some degree of military 
capability even though strictly speaking they are not part of the armed forces.’178 It has 
being argued that maintaining these types of units to deal with domestic policing is out of 
line with the freedoms associated with modern society and that these units can, ‘often be 
associated with authoritarian or repressive tendencies, and are seen as an at least potential 
threat to civil liberties.’179 Nonetheless, these units have increased dramatically since the 
early 1990’s with the Schengen agreement being posited as a reason and also the need for 
tightened border security to combat international terrorism.180 It has been advanced that 
this gendarmerie style of policing has increased in Britain since 9/11 with more regular 
deployment of armed police units.181 Many of these armed police units are trained by 
military units like the Special Air Service, blurring the lines between military and 
policing.182 Furthermore, due to the increasing use of this style of policing, ‘existing 
gendarmeries will continue to be upgraded and receive high levels of funding, and 
perhaps also that countries which thus far have not had such agencies will begin to create 
gendarmerie-type forces.’183 While it must be acknowledged that the United Kingdom is 
currently undergoing its withdrawal from the EU, the cultural of armed policing is very 
much ingrained in its policing culture. Nonetheless, it would be very difficult to envisage 
the United Kingdom not continuing to mirror international norms in policing.       
    Where this issue creates the greatest disquiet is with the protection of life principle and 
the ECtHR margin of appreciation afforded to countries based on their own internal 
criteria.184 The margin of appreciation is a judicial tool developed due to the lack of 
consensus on Convention rights among contracting States.185 The ECtHR affords States 
a certain amount of deference based on the ‘idea that each society must decide certain 
fundamental issues for itself.’186 It would also be difficult to envisage that a harmonisation 
of policing would adopt a style utilised by the minority of policing services in Europe.        
 
      Considering this in terms of the harmonisation of policing, which European States 
margin of appreciation will be the one that forms the human rights standards of the 
common policing model in Europe? As it would be improbable to apply a different level 
of judicial scrutiny to member States of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
when they employ common European policing practices. This could invariably erode 
human rights standards during policing operations, as EU member States have shown 
through the need to develop the margin of appreciation principle, that there is little 
consensus on human rights standards. 
    It has being posited that the margin of appreciation applied to the right to life, 
‘undermines the aspirational, universal nature of one of the cornerstones of the human 
rights regime.’187 The question has also been posed as to, ‘how much protection does the 
right to life offer if the protection due to a given individual differs depending on whether 
she is located in State X or State Y?.’188 This is a serious issue to reflect on, as innocent 
lives have been lost during anti-terrorist operations due to different policing methods 
utilised in different States. This can be seen in both the Finogenov and Da Silva cases. It 
is clear from Finogenov that the ECtHR judged the potential consequences for not 
employing the gas and not the right to life of the individuals who died.  Nonetheless, the 
EU is developing a harmonisation of policing in Europe through the Standing Committee 
on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI).189 Having dealt with the 
apprehensions raised over the use of toxic chemicals in policing operations, and the 
harmonisation programme, it is necessary to consider other special measures adopted by 
police services to tackle terrorism. 
A policing or military solution to contemporary terrorism? 
Peter Squires and Peter Kennison compare the use of force methods of policing and the 
military. They contend that policing traditionally uses a restraint model, while the 
military, ‘is characterised by low discretion, hierarchal chains of command, ‘risk 
management’ or overwhelming superiority of firepower at close quarters and target 
incapacitation (arguably ‘shooting to kill) to eliminate the danger.’190 The military style 
could be considered as more comparable with  a shoot-to-kill policy like KRATOS than 
the police model of restraint. 
   Squires and Kennison advance that a policy like KRATOS falls into a grey area of 
law.191 The reason being is that any use of force by a police officer prior to this was 
essentially subjective, based on the individual officers assessment of the situation. But 
they contend that operation KRATOS removes this element from the, ‘constable, 
effectively making him a paramilitary arm of the state.’192 They further advance that 
policing terrorism; 
And its use of force, treads an increasingly difficult path between the rule of law 
and paramilitarism. Exceptional methods and policies like Operation KRATOS at 
the high end of policing have blurred the distinction between uncompromising 
military solutions and the traditional police use of force.193 
    These are salient points to be considered when States are justifying exceptional 
measures in tackling terrorism, and furthermore the European Court of Human of Rights 
is facilitating these measures with its margin of appreciation. Are States developing a 
security state agenda with a consequentialist reasoning for police tactics based on a fear 
of the potential consequence for not acting. What is also of concern is whether these 
exceptional measures will be considered part and parcel of the harmonisation of Policing 
in the EU. Squires and Kennison, in their most crucial assessment on the police adopting 
exceptional measures and measures that led to the death of Jean Charles de Menezes, 
state; 
In rolling out its strategy, it appeared to obscure or to forget some very basic 
principles about the very purpose of policing and in the event took the life of an 
innocent civilian in London (…) is an indication that it had already lost touch with 
fundamental policing priorities: the preservation of life, the minimisation of risks 
and promotion of public safety.194 
Policing has lost its traditional focus and that is a cause for concern, as the police appear 
to be progressing towards a more military style. A recent judgment of  the ECtHR, Catt 
v The United Kingdom saw the UK government argue the indefinite retention of police 
intelligence, citing domestic extremism as a rationale for retaining the data of an 
individual present at public demonstrations.195This is evidence demonstrating an 
evolution of general policing practice in the direction of special policing measures. It is a 
clear sign of a move away from constitutional states and toward security states.  
Conclusion  
It was advanced in the introduction that the international standards provide a more robust 
and consistent foundation to the protection of life during policing operations. The Special 
Rapporteur voiced concerns about shoot-to-kill policies and it is important to reiterate his 
sentiment in light of the examination of the shooting of Jean Charles De Menezes;  
The rhetoric of shoot-to-kill serves only to displace clear legal standards with a 
vaguely defined licence to kill, risking confusion among law enforcement officers, 
endangering innocent persons, and rationalizing mistakes, while avoiding the 
genuinely difficult challenges that are posed by the relevant threat.196      
      It is important to consider this point in light of the KRATOS policy that essentially 
led to the death of an innocent man. Jean Charles De Menezes was shot and killed by 
armed police in London, during a situation that did not fully fit into any of the police 
policies drafted to deal with suicide bombers.197 This essentially caused confusion around 
the methods to be employed by the firearms officers and, as a result, an innocent man 
died.198 It is for this reason that it is hard to argue against the logic of the Special 
Rapporteur on shoot-to kill policies. Vague shoot-to-kill policies like KRATOS cause 
confusion and potentially increase the risk to innocent people, they have the potential to 
erode public confidence in the police. Scheinin, in his report, raises concerns about the 
exceptional measures employed by States to tackle terrorism and voices that the 
community model of policing has the potential to be more effective than the paramilitary 
style of policing;199 
Successful counter-terrorism operations depend on the cooperation of the 
communities where the suspects live. The Special Rapporteur therefore calls on 
States to foster community policing initiatives that build partnerships of trust 
between law-enforcement agencies and the ethic and other communities.200 
     This appears to be in contrast to the growth of gendarmerie style policing in Europe 
and the development of exceptional policing measures. The position advanced in the 
introduction suggested that the international human rights standards of legality, absolute 
necessity and strict proportionality provide the greatest degree of balance; between the 
need for effective policing to tackle terrorism and the right to life. They are applicable to 
any situation a police officer faces from a minor public order incident to a suicide bomber. 
They are not confined to single policies but provide an overarching framework that every 
individual police officer can utilise based on the circumstances they face. They create no 
confusion in their implementation and fit within the belief that each individual police 
officer should be responsible for their actions. The fundamental issue facing society is the 
consequentialists-based reasoning of the ECtHR that places the  rights of the individual 
as secondary to the perceived need of State agencies to protect society at any cost. It may 
be a while again before one of these cases comes before the ECtHR but by the time it will 
the use of special policing measure will have already been intrenched in policing practice. 
It will be too late at that stage as policing will have crossed the Rubicon, leaving 
constitutional states and embracing security states. As the ECtHR has excused special 
policing measures, it may not remain within the sole preview of protecting society from 
terrorism and could become the accepted norm of policing generally. It appears that the 
Special Rapporteurs are the only advocates of the right to life during policing operations. 
It is time that the ECtHR returned to the human rights-based reasoning that was a corner 
stone of McCann and away from the consequentialist reasoning seen in Finogenov and 
Da Silva. 
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